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Sharing within communities has gained popularity in recent years. However, taking part
in a community also comes with a certain amount of risk. This perceived amount
of risk can be contained by regulations within a community as well as by potential
participants’ trust in the community and the other members. We argue for a relation
between regulation and the willingness to take the risk of joining a sharing community
with trust as a mediator. Thereby, we distinguish between two kinds of regulation (soft
and harsh regulation) and two kinds of trust (implicit and reason-based trust) on two
different levels (vertical and horizontal trust). In one laboratory and one online experiment
with 432 participants overall, we found that the compound of high soft and low harsh
regulation increases participants’ willingness to take the risk of participation and that the
effect of soft regulation is mediated mainly by vertical and horizontal reason-based trust.
Based on our results, we encourage sharing communities to count on soft regulation in
order to increase potential members’ trust in the community and therefore take the risk
to participate.
Keywords: sharing economy, communities, harsh regulation, soft regulation, trust, risk preference
INTRODUCTION
The sharing economy encompasses different social and economic practices and replaces ownership
with the temporal access to goods (cf. Botsman and Rogers, 2010; Belk, 2014). Prominent examples
of the sharing economy are online peer-to-peer (P2P) marketplaces, so-called sharing-economy
platforms (e.g., Dillahunt and Malone, 2015), like Airbnb, an online marketplace facilitating
accommodation sharing between private persons (Guttentag, 2015). Besides these P2P platforms,
sharing activities are often organized in communities, which refer to one of the three centerpieces
of the sharing economy (Acquier et al., 2017). In these communities, a good is shared, organized,
and maintained by people who have in common that they all want to make use of the same goods
(cf. Glover et al., 2005; Birky and Strom, 2013). This more social and less anonymous form of
sharing can be referred to as sharing community (cf. Bardhi and Eckhardt, 2012) and comes with
individual, societal, and environmental benefits (cf. Heinrichs, 2013; Kim et al., 2015). One example
for such a sharing community is community gardens, in which a group of people share a piece
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of land, the tools, and often also the harvest (cf. Litt et al., 2011).
Another example is housing communities sharing their own
pool of cars, whereby all community members are responsible
for the organization and maintenance of the shared cars
(Hasan et al., 2018).
Sharing with strangers always implies risks, and especially
sharing communities, which regulate themselves (Hofmann et al.,
2017b), suffer from non-cooperative behavior. Some individuals
try to take advantage of the shared goods without contributing
anything and in this way exploit the community (Hardin, 1968;
Hamari et al., 2016), for example, community members that leave
a shared car dirty or with an empty fuel tank. Because associated
risks and uncertainty are a barrier to participate in collaborative
consumption (Lee et al., 2016), it is important to investigate how
these risks can be minimized.
Research indicates that minimizing risks by using regulation
and trust is essential to attract new members for participation
(Slovic, 1987; Grabner-Kräuter and Kaluscha, 2003; Hamari et al.,
2015). However, it is not completely clear how regulation, trust,
and risks are linked to each other. The absence of regulation
is related to several hazardous consequences, for example, high
perceived risk (cf. Slovic, 1987), low participation (cf. Lowndes
et al., 2006), conflicts (cf. Sabitzer et al., 2018), and distrust and
low cooperation of community members (cf. Hartl et al., 2016).
Regulation seems to be a key factor to prevent negative outcomes,
which can be used as a guide to help members to behave properly
in different situations. Further, some recent studies on sharing
communities found that regulation is significantly related to trust
(Sabitzer et al., 2018) and research on tax compliance showed that
trust in the tax authority is related to regulation (Hofmann et al.,
2017a). Therefore, we assume that regulation is a trust-building
measure; first, it enhances trust, and in turn, people perceive
participation as less risky, leading them to join the community.
In this research, the effect of regulation and trust (as a possible
mediator) on risk perception and actual risk-taking behavior is
part of the analysis. The construct which is able to combine
perceived risk and the decision to take this risk (joining the
community) is called risk preference (cf. Charness et al., 2013).
On the one hand, people prefer to be risk aversive, risk neutral,
or risk seeking (Chiles and McMackin, 1996); on the other
hand, external factors like the framing of a decision can change
people’s risk preference (cf. Tversky and Kahneman, 1989; Frey
et al., 2017). Thus, regulation could also change consumers’ risk
preference, leading them to participate in the sharing community.
As past research on the sharing economy mainly investigated
P2P platforms (e.g., Cannon and Summers, 2014; Edelman and
Luca, 2014; Ert et al., 2016; Shaheen et al., 2017), this paper fills
a gap by focusing on the under-researched domain of sharing
communities, which according to Acquier et al. (2017) are one of
the three foundational cores of the sharing economy. In addition,
this paper contributes to theory and practice by extending
knowledge about the relationship between regulation, trust, and
risk preference. This becomes especially relevant in sharing
communities in which no authority is present to shape people’s
behavior in order to reduce risks for participation. Accordingly,
the insights of this research can help to organize sharing
communities, make potential members perceive participation as
less risky, and hence facilitate their willingness to participate.
Thus, we investigate if regulatory measures are able to change the
risk preference of potential community members, leading them
to join a sharing community. In a first study, the direct effect of
regulation on risk preference is investigated using a laboratory
setting with real consequences for participants. In a second study,
the mentioned possible mediation effect of trust is examined.
In the next section, the theoretical background of sharing
communities and the relations between risk preference,
regulation, and trust will be discussed. Afterward, two studies are
presented. Finally, we will discuss the paper’s results, limitations,
and implications.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The Role of Sharing Communities
In the last decade, the term sharing economy has been
used for several different organizational forms, which have in
common that ownership is replaced by the temporary access
to goods (Bardhi and Eckhardt, 2012). The sharing economy
is defined as “consumers granting each other temporary access
to underutilized physical assets (‘idle capacity’), possibly for
money” (Frenken and Schor, 2017, pp. 4–5). To contribute to
a clear definition of the concept, Acquier et al. (2017) proposed
a framework, in which the sharing economy is used as an
umbrella term for three organizational core parts, namely, the
access economy, the platform economy, and the community-
based economy. In this sense, sharing communities represent
the community-based economy. Based on previous statements,
we define a sharing community as a group of people whose
members grant each other access to underutilized physical assets
(idle capacity), whereby all community members are responsible
for organization and maintenance of the shared goods.
In the sharing economy, previous research mainly investigated
the access and platform economy (e.g., Cohen and Kietzmann,
2014; Zervas et al., 2017). Inexplicably, sharing communities are
still the least investigated organizational form of the sharing
economy. One possible explanation for this gap in research
is that sharing communities still do not reach a critical mass
to compete with traditional market alternatives (Bradley and
Pargman, 2017). Although participation is still on a low level,
the popularity of sharing communities rapidly increased over the
last decade. For example, in Vienna, in 2010, only 13 community
gardens were actively supervised by Gartenpolylog (2017a), an
organization to support establishment of community gardens,
while in 2019, the number already sextupled to 83 community
gardens. Community-based sharing can have valuable outcomes
for consumers, society, and the environment (Heinrichs, 2013;
Puschmann and Alt, 2016). Participation facilitates equality and
integration of disadvantaged people through social interaction
and inclusion in a group (Wakefield et al., 2007; Litt et al.,
2011). Besides social aspects, economic and ecological aspects
also play a role. When people share and provide what they have,
they can save money as they do not have to purchase the good
they only need temporarily (Möhlmann, 2015). Furthermore,
as a consequence, sharing grants the possibility for sustainable
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development as less goods have to be produced, and hence,
waste is reduced (Puschmann and Alt, 2016). To conclude,
sharing communities hold the potential to contribute to social,
ecological, and economic sustainability (cf. Lozano, 2008) and
support livability on a political, social and societal, individual,
and educational levels (Gartenpolylog, 2017b). Therefore, the
proliferation of sharing communities should be fostered to make
use of these potential positive outcomes of community-based
sharing. However, uncertainty and perceived risks hinder people
to take part in collaborative consumption (Lee et al., 2016),
and without enough interested members, a sharing community
cannot be formed. Thus, it is essential to investigate how the
risk preference (perceived risks and risk-taking behavior) of
consumers can be changed to attract new community members.
Risk Preference
Risk is “a characteristic of decisions that is defined as the extent to
which there is uncertainty about whether potentially significant
and/or disappointing outcomes of decisions will be realized”
(Sitkin and Pablo, 1992, p. 10). How much risk a person is
willing to take determines their risk preference (Charness et al.,
2013). People’s risk preference can vary between risk aversive,
risk neutral, or risk seeking (Chiles and McMackin, 1996). Risk
preference consists of both a stable trait component that explains
about 50% of the variance and other factors (e.g., domain-
specific or measurement-specific components) that explain the
remaining variance (Frey et al., 2017). This entails that, at
least partly, risk preference is influenced by variable factors, for
example, through the framing of decisions that influence their
domain-specific components (cf. Tversky and Kahneman, 1989).
We expect that by varying information about used regulation in
a sharing community, it is possible to shape people’s perception
of risk and in turn their risk-taking behavior. Risk perception
is defined as the subjective expectation of loss for choosing a
particular option, which is important when making decisions
under uncertainty (cf. Forsythe and Shi, 2003), and risk taking is
a characteristic of consumer behavior and part of every decision
(Bauer, 2001). In this paper, risk preference is not understood as
eliciting a personal trait between risk aversion and risk seeking
(cf. Chiles and McMackin, 1996) but as perceived risk and actual
risk-taking behavior for two confronted options. Even though
humans do not always decide rationally, in economic games,
people usually decide for the option with the higher expected
value or outcome (Simon, 1955). With the method of elicitation,
the expected value for both options stays the same between
experimental groups.
In recent literature, there is evidence that reducing the
level of perceived risk is key to attracting new consumers
for participation (Sheau-Fen et al., 2012). When people are
confronted on whether or not to participate in a sharing
community, they do not know if they will get the anticipated
outcome. For example, gardeners do not know if other members
will water their plants when they are on vacation. Thus, it is
uncertain if the gardeners will reap what they sowed. People use
subjective judgments to estimate the probability of an uncertain
negative or positive result (cf. Kahneman et al., 1982). If potential
community members estimate a high probability for a negative
outcome and thus perceive high risk, it is unlikely that they will
join the community, particularly if other less risky alternatives
are available. Furthermore, research shows that people who
expect a decision to have a profitable outcome are more risk
tolerant (Grable, 2000); thus, their expectation shapes their risk
preference. However, when people do not know what to expect,
they rely on additional relevant information to make subjective
judgments and assess the risk for choosing a specific alternative
(Aven and Zio, 2011). We assume that by informing potential
consumers of regulation procedures within sharing communities,
it is possible to shape people’s expectation for a positive outcome
and, thus, their risk preference.
Regulation
One possible way to provide people with relevant information
and reduce the level of perceived risk is through regulation
(Slovic, 1987). Hence, the introduction of an appropriate form
of regulation could be a way to shape peoples’ risk preference.
Particularly, sharing communities lack in regulation and thus
have a high demand for it (Hofmann et al., 2017b) to reduce
risks and prevent community members from exploitation (cf.
Hartl et al., 2016). Two forms of regulation can be distinguished:
harsh regulation and soft regulation (Raven et al., 1998). Harsh
regulation is defined by the strict setting up of rules and
performing controls and sanctions when rules are not followed
(cf. Raven et al., 1998). Soft regulation on the other hand is
a supportive way to influence people’s behavior, based on a
legitimized authority that possesses knowledge, has access to
relevant information, and acts in a way people can identify with
(Gangl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2017b).
Current research indicates that soft regulation positively
influences contributions to shared goods in public goods games
(Hofmann et al., 2019). Other literature on regulation in
the sharing economy shows that the perception of regulation
differs between organizational models. Harsh regulation is often
perceived as being part of the access economy, while soft
regulation is perceived as equally high in the access, platform,
and community-based economies (Hofmann et al., 2017b).
Research also indicates that regulation in sharing communities is
important but also that strict regulation should only be applied
in severe cases, for example, if a member intentionally harms
the community, such as through stealing or damaging something
(Sabitzer et al., 2018). Too much use of harsh regulation might
give the impression that others are not sticking to the rules,
thereby diminishing trust in other members (Mulder et al., 2006).
Trust
Besides the introduction of regulation, the establishment of trust
is also important to reduce perceived risks and hence attract
new members for participation (Slovic, 1987; Grabner-Kräuter
and Kaluscha, 2003; Hamari et al., 2015). Trust can be defined
as “a willingness to be vulnerable to another party” and “the
willingness to take a risk” (Schoorman et al., 2007, pp. 346f.).
Hence, the amount of risk someone takes depends on the amount
of trust (Viklund, 2003; Schoorman et al., 2007). In sharing
communities in which perceived risk and uncertainty are high at
the beginning, as strangers come together to share goods, trust
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becomes essential, especially trust in other community members
(Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002; Kalkbrenner and Roosen, 2016;
Mittendorf, 2018).
We distinguish between implicit and reason-based trust as
proposed by Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010). Implicit trust
develops automatically and unwittingly (e.g., through triggers
such as similar social identities with the trusted party), whereas
reason-based trust is based on rational and conscious cognitive
processes in which internal and external factors influence
whether to trust or not (e.g., competence and behavior of the
other party) (Gangl et al., 2015). In addition, different forms of
trust can be identified based on the hierarchical position of the
entity which is trusted in. Hofmann et al. (2017b) differentiate
between horizontal and vertical trust in the sharing economy.
Horizontal trust represents trust in other members of the same
hierarchical group, while vertical trust is the trust in an entity in
hierarchically higher groups. In the case of a sharing community,
there is a smooth transition between horizontal and vertical trust
as vertical trust refers to trust in the community as a whole. In
this paper, we take all aspects of trust into account and distinguish
between implicit and reason-based trust on a horizontal level and
vertical level. We assume that by generating trust and hence the
confidence that others will not exploit one’s own vulnerability (cf.
Schoorman et al., 2007), people are more willing to take the risk
to participate in a sharing community.
The Connection Between Regulation,
Risk, and Trust
Perceived risk can be reduced by providing people with
relevant information about regulatory measures (Slovic, 1987).
Furthermore, Schoorman et al. (2007, p. 346) argued that “when
the risk in a situation is greater than the trust (and, thus,
the willingness to take risk) a control system can bridge the
difference by lowering the perceived risk to a level that can
be managed by trust.” Recent studies point out that especially
soft regulation is effective in shaping people’s behavior in the
sharing economy (Hofmann et al., 2019). Moreover, studies
on sharing communities show that regulation and trust are
significantly correlated, whereby a positive relation is found
between soft regulation and reason-based trust (Sabitzer et al.,
2018). Furthermore, a relation between regulation and trust was
recognized in research on tax compliance, whereby again soft
regulation was effective in changing people’s reason-based trust
in the tax authority (Hofmann et al., 2017a).
As mentioned above, risk preference is influenced not only by
regulation but also by trust (cf. Grabner-Kräuter and Kaluscha,
2003). “Trust is not taking risk per se, but rather it is a willingness
to take risk” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 712), which implies that
these two concepts are inextricably linked to each other. Hence,
risk preference seems to be dependent on the amount of trust
(Viklund, 2003; Schoorman et al., 2007). Additionally, evidence
on the relation between trust and risk derives from research on
online markets. Consumers perceive a lower level of risk when
they trust the online vendor, which leads to a higher purchase
intention and in turn to more purchases (Grabner-Kräuter and
Kaluscha, 2003; Kim et al., 2008). Similar mechanisms are
expected to occur in sharing communities whereby trust in the
community is expected to reduce perceived risks and hence
increase people’s willingness to join.
Therefore, the question of whether regulation in a sharing
community can be used to generate trust arises, which in turn
affects people’s risk preference. In this sense, trust may influence
the level of perceived risk and in turn the willingness to take
the risk. From literature, it is not clear if risk preference is
directly caused by regulation or mediated by trust. We propose
the following hypotheses (also see Figure 1):
H1. Regulation increases the preference to take the risk of
participating in the sharing community.
H2. Soft regulation increases horizontal implicit trust,
which leads to a higher preference to take the risk of the
sharing community.
H3. Soft regulation increases vertical implicit trust, which
leads to a higher preference to take the risk of the
sharing community.
H4. Soft regulation increases horizontal reason-based trust,
which leads to a higher preference to take the risk of the
sharing community.
H5. Soft regulation increases vertical reason-based trust,
which leads to a higher preference to take the risk of the
sharing community.
We start with the investigation of the direct effect of
regulation on risk preference in a laboratory experiment, with
real consequences for participants (H1). Afterward, the assumed
mediation effect of trust will be investigated in an online
experiment (H2–H5).
STUDY 1
Method
Sample
A convenience sample of 240 individuals was recruited via
the subject pool of the Vienna University of Economics and
Business. Six participants were excluded from the analysis
because they did not follow the instructions and consequently
their inputs could not be coded properly. Thus, the final sample
consisted of 234 participants (60.3% women; Mage = 23.63,
SDage = 5.76). Most participants stated to have basic qualifications
for university entry as their highest education (74.4%), and
73.1% reported to have a net income of less than 1000 euros
per month. Most participants held a driving license (82.1%),
and 47% stated to already have experience with car sharing.
Furthermore, the participants stated to be rather environmentally
conscious (environmental consciousness: M = 6.37, SD = 0.74),
tend to consume environmentally friendly products (green
consumerism: M = 5.06, SD = 1.25), stated to be moderately risk
seeking (risk seeking: M = 3.96, SD = 1.41), and stated to be
moderately trustful in general (trustfulness: M = 4.22, SD = 1.44;
all scales from 1 “I don’t agree at all” to 7 “I totally agree”).
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FIGURE 1 | Research model.
Procedure and Material
The procedure of study 1 is sketched in a flowchart in
Figure 2. Below, the individual blocks of the diagram are
described in more detail.
Introduction and scenario description
Participants were invited to the computer laboratory where 15
sessions with 8–20 participants were conducted. Participants
took part in a laboratory experiment which was created with
the software zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). In an introductory part,
it was explained that all computers are linked to each other
and that the participants would have to imagine sharing a car
in a group of four people. They were told that these groups
consisted of the participants in the room and that they would
be randomly assigned to one of these groups. In addition, they
were informed that financial remuneration depended on their
own decisions, but also on the decisions of the other participants
in the experiment. On the screen, participants received then the
following information:
“Imagine, you run a delivery service and need a car for your work.
Since you do not own a car but instantly need one, you consult two
friends to evaluate the best options. You have 5000 experimental
currency units (ECU) to invest in a car. Your friends tell you about
two different possibilities.”
Information about the two possibilities
In the fictitious scenario, the 5000 ECU (1000 ECU were
equivalent to a 1-euro payoff) could either be invested in a used
car (with a probability of 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, or 90%
that the car would break down) or in a community car, which
would be maintained and shared by the participant and three
other community members (i.e., three other participants in the
experiment) (see Table 1).
It was explained that if the used car broke down shortly after
the purchase, the investment would be gone but that if it did
not break down, they earned 10,000 ECU with their delivery
service and hence doubled their investment. Otherwise, if they
decided for the community car, their earnings depended on the
investment of all four community members, who shared the
car. The overall investment of all four community members was
also doubled and equally redistributed to all four participants.
Participants earned 10,000 ECU in the case that all members
invested their whole endowment of 5000 ECU.
The decision between the used car and the community car
and therefore participants’ risk preference were measured using
an adaptation of the multiple price list (MPL) method by Holt
and Laury (2002), whereby a list with nine decisions between
two alternatives is presented to the participants (see Table 1). In
the MPL method, the possible outcome of both alternatives stays
the same over all nine decisions; the only thing that changes is the
probability of this outcome (Charness et al., 2013). Participants
were informed that their payoff is dependent on their decisions
in the MPL task. In this paper, we adapted the MPL method,
whereby we changed the probability of the outcome of one
alternative in all nine rows similar to the original task (for
the used car), but the outcome and probability of the second
alternative (community car) stayed unknown in all nine rows.
This method allowed us to estimate perceived risk parameters of
uncertain events as well as to measure actual risk-taking behavior.
Participants received the information that at the end of the
study, the probability for the used car breaking down would be
randomly determined by a blind draw of the participant out of a
stack of nine different cards marked with the probabilities 10 up
to 90%. If they drew, for example, a card with a 50% chance of the
used car breaking down and they had opted for the used car at the
50%, a roll with a dice decided if the car actually had any damage.
Otherwise, if they had opted for the community car, their payout
depended on the investment of all four community members.
Therefore, the design of the experiment allowed measuring the
dependent variable risk preference (preference for either a known
probability and possible outcome or an uncertain outcome, which
is dependent on other people’s behavior).
Description of the community
Before asking participants’ to actually fill in the measure for
risk preference (see Table 1), they received different information
about the community. The community was described as using
a combination of either high or low soft regulation (e.g., “The
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FIGURE 2 | Flowchart of procedure with manipulation of high/low harsh regulation (HR±) and high/low soft regulation (SR±).
community is often/rarely available to members to discuss
issues that arise”) and high or low harsh regulation (e.g., “The
community has decided to monitor compliance with the usage
rules often/seldom”). This resulted in an experimental two (harsh
regulation: low vs. high) by two (soft regulation: low vs. high)
between-subject design. Further, a control group without a
description of the community was added. This group saw a blank
screen for the time it took the participants of the other conditions
to read the description. This finally resulted in five conditions.
Decisions between the used car and the community car
After reading the information about the community, participants
were asked if they wanted to buy the used car or share
the community car (see Table 1). This measurement of risk
preference is an adaptation of the MPL method from Holt and
Laury (2002). The combination with real monetary payoffs allows
us to estimate perceived risk parameters of the uncertain event
(outcome of the community car) and measure actual risk-taking
behavior, all within the construct risk preference. In our adapted
MPL experiment, participants (except extreme risk seekers) start
with the used car and at some point, when they perceive the risk
of the uncertain option as lower, switch to the community car (cf.
Charness et al., 2013).
TABLE 1 | Decision between used and community cars.
Probability that the used car breaks
down shortly after purchase
I want to buy the
used car
I want to use the
community car
10% ? ?
20% ? ?
30% ? ?
40% ? ?
50% ? ?
60% ? ?
70% ? ?
80% ? ?
90% ? ?
After making their decisions, all participants were instructed
to imagine that they would be a member of the previously
described community and would share a car with three other
community members, or three other participants. This was
necessary, in order to have all relevant information for the
payment at the end of the study, even if the participant completely
decided against the usage of the community car.
Sharing a community car
In the beginning of this part of the experiment, participants
were introduced to the rules of sharing a community car, which
was based on a public goods game (cf. Fischbacher et al., 2001).
Participants were assigned to communities of four, and all four
participants could decide how much of their endowment of
5000 ECU they wanted to invest in a shared community car.
Afterward, the total investment of all four participants was
doubled and equally redistributed to the participants. Three
examples demonstrated these rules and how the result and final
payout would be calculated. Subsequently, they decided how
much they wanted to invest. On the next page, the overall
investment of the four community members and the individual
outcome were displayed.
Manipulation check, scales, and demographics
After the experimental part, participants filled in a questionnaire
consisting of the scales harsh regulation (three items, e.g., “The
community punishes strictly”) and soft regulation (seven items,
e.g., “The community passes on information comprehensibly”)
(both used for manipulation check), reason-based trust in
the whole community (vertical, seven items, e.g., “I trust the
community, because it performs its tasks well”), reason-based
trust in the other users (horizontal, seven items, e.g., “I trust
the other members, because they perform their tasks well”),
implicit trust in the whole community (vertical, three items,
e.g., “Most of the time, I trust the community without thinking
about it”), and implicit trust in the other users (horizontal,
three items, e.g., “ Most of the time, I trust the other members
without thinking about it”), based on Hofmann et al. (2014).
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Additionally, risk seeking (four items; Colquitt et al., 2006,
e.g., “I enjoy being reckless”), trustfulness (four items; adapted
from Cattell, 2001, e.g., “I trust in others”), environmental
consciousness (six items; Alsmadi, 2007, e.g., “I respect all
efforts to maintain and preserve the environment”), and green
consumerism (five items; Alsmadi, 2007, e.g., “I usually buy
environment-friendly products”) were assessed. The survey was
finished with questions on the experience with the sharing
economy and demographics. The internal consistency was
satisfying for all scales (Cronbach’s α> 0.83).
Payment
After completion of the questionnaire, a chart was shown with
the previously made decisions of the participant between the used
car and the community car for the different probabilities of the
used car breaking down (see Table 1), as well as their result of
sharing the community car. Their payment was determined as
described above, based on the drawn card, their corresponding
decision, and the dice roll. The result of the used car was either
0 ECU/euro (if it broke down) or 10,000 ECU, or 10 euros
(if it did not break down). The result with the community
car was also 10,000 ECU, or 10 euros, if all other community
members contributed the whole amount of their endowment.
In the case where participants earned less than five euros in
the experiment, they were still paid five euros as a show-up fee.
However, they did not know about this show-up fee until the end
of the study in order to make sure this does not influence the
participants’ decisions in the experiment. The average payment
of all participants was 7.80 euro.
Results
First, in order to test if the manipulation of harsh and soft
regulations worked as intended, a MANOVA in a two (condition
harsh regulation: high vs. low) by two (condition soft regulation:
high vs. low) design with the scales harsh regulation and soft
regulation as dependent variables was calculated. The results
showed that participants in the condition of high harsh regulation
(HR+) ascribe significantly higher levels of harsh regulation to
the car-sharing community than participants in the condition
of low harsh regulation (HR−) [MHR+ = 4.95, SDHR+ = 0.17;
MHR− = 2.27, SDHR− = 0.17; F(1,232) = 131.04, p < 0.01,
ηp
2 = 0.36]. Also, participants in the condition of high soft
regulation (SR+) rate the car-sharing community to operate
with higher levels of soft regulation than participants of the low
soft regulation condition (SR−) [MSR+ = 4.76, SDSR+ = 0.11;
MSR− = 3.41, SDSR− = 0.11; F(1,232) = 78.10, p < 0.01,
ηp
2 = 0.25]. These results indicated that the manipulation
worked as intended.
Afterward, to test the hypotheses that regulation increases the
willingness to take the risk of the car-sharing community instead
of the used car (H1), an ANOVA in a two (condition harsh
regulation: high vs. low) by two (condition soft regulation: high
vs. low) design was calculated. Thereby, participants’ answer on
the MPL was chosen as a dependent variable (risk preference).
The ANOVA showed that high soft regulation leads to a
significant higher willingness to take the risk of the car sharing
community instead of the used car on the MPL [F(1,189) = 4.85,
p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.03]. The effect of harsh regulation was not
significant [F(1,189) = 0.48, p = 0.49, ηp2 < 0.01]. However,
the interaction effect of soft and harsh regulation was significant
[F(1,189) = 5.37, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.03]. The means on the
MPL of the actual five conditions (HR+/SR+, HR−/SR+, HR+/
SR−, HR−/ SR−, and control) revealed that participants in
the condition of high soft and low harsh regulations prefer the
uncertain risk of joining the car-sharing community at a lower
probability of a breakdown of the used car than participants of
the other conditions (M = 39.58, SD = 14.43) (see Figure 3).
Furthermore, a correlation analysis revealed a significant
relation between soft regulation and vertical implicit trust
(r = 0.18) and a highly significant relation between soft
regulation and vertical reason-based trust (r = 0.28). In addition,
soft regulation and risk preference were significantly related
(r = −0.16), while harsh regulation showed no significant
correlation with any kind of trust or risk preference (see Table 2).
Discussion
Based on these results, we conclude that the combination of high
soft regulation and low harsh regulation influences people’s risk
preference the most and increases people’s willingness to take the
risk of a sharing community instead of a used car. In experiment
1, due to the necessity of playing the public goods game in order
to get a realistic scenario, the questionnaire about trust could only
be implemented afterward. At this point, participants already
knew the results of the public goods game, the contributions
of the other players, and how much money they would earn
when leaving the laboratory. We assume that this knowledge
had a non-negligible influence on participants’ answers to the
trust scale. However, the results of the ANOVA and correlation
analysis indicate that soft regulation is an important factor on
risk preference and participation in a sharing community and
correlates with implicit and reason-based trust on the vertical
level. Therefore, in order to specifically test if trust mediates the
relationship between soft regulation and risk preference (H2–
H5), a second study was conducted.
STUDY 2
Method
Sample
A convenience sample of 220 individuals was recruited via the
subject pool of the Vienna University of Economics and Business.
Twenty-two participants were excluded from the analysis because
they stated to have taken part in study 1 and therefore have
knowledge that could have influenced their answers in study 2.
The final sample consisted of 198 participants (63.1% female;
Mage = 24.45, SDage = 6.00). Most participants stated to have
basic qualifications for university entry as their highest education
(63.6%), and 65.7% reported to have a net income of 1000 euros
or less per month. About two-thirds (66.7%) reported living
in a city with more than 300,000 inhabitants. The majority of
participants held a driving license (86.9%), and 33.3% already
used car sharing at least once. Furthermore, the participants
stated to be moderately risk seeking (risk seeking: M = 3.38,
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FIGURE 3 | Means and standard error of risk preference per condition.
SD = 1.30) and moderately trustful in general (trustfulness:
M = 3.99, SD = 1.33).
Procedure and Material
The fictitious scenario was similar to that in study 1. Participants
took part in an online experiment and were asked to imagine
that they operated a delivery service but did not own a car. They
were told that they had 5000 monetary units (ECU), which they
could either invest in a used car (with a probability that the car
breaks down) or in a community car, which was shared between
the participant and three other people. They were informed that,
if the used car broke down, the investment was gone. However,
if it did not break down, they would earn 10,000 ECU with
their delivery service (investment is doubled). Otherwise, if they
decided for the community car, their earnings depended on the
TABLE 2 | Means, standard deviations, and correlations.
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Harsh regulation
2 Soft regulation −0.02
3 Implicit trust vertical 0.01 0.18*
4 Reason-based trust
vertical
−0.01 0.28** 0.61**
5 Implicit trust horizontal −0.02 0.05 0.60** 0.45**
6 Reason-based trust
horizontal
0.04 0.10 0.42** 0.70** 0.50**
7 Risk preference 0.05 −0.16* −0.13 −0.14 −0.08 0.03
N = 191. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.001.
overall investment of all four community members. Before asking
about their decision, they were told that they visited the website of
the community and received information about the community,
which was displayed in the discussion forum. The community
was described as using either low soft regulation (e.g., “The
community is rarely available to members to discuss issues that
arise.”) or high soft regulation (e.g., “The community is often
available to members to discuss issues that arise.”).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two
experimental conditions, resulting in a between-subject design
(low vs. high soft regulation). After reading the information
about the community, they were asked if they would buy the
used car or use the community car, for different probabilities
that the used car could break down (see Table 1). After their
decisions, participants filled in a questionnaire consisting of the
same scales as in study 1, namely, reason-based trust in the whole
community (vertical, seven items), reason-based trust in the
other users (horizontal, seven items), implicit trust in the whole
community (vertical, three items), and implicit trust in the other
users (horizontal, three items), based on Hofmann et al. (2014).
Additionally, the variables risk seeking (four items; Colquitt et al.,
2006) and trustfulness (four items; Cattell, 2001) were assessed.
The survey finished with questions on car-sharing experience
and demographics. The internal consistency was satisfying for all
scales (Cronbach’s α> 0.86).
Results
In order to test Hypotheses 2–5, mediation analyses were
performed with PROCESS (Hayes, 2017) (see Figure 4 for an
overview). First, we tested if horizontal implicit trust mediates
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FIGURE 4 | Results of mediation analyses.
the effect of soft regulation on risk preference (H2). In step
1 of the mediation model, the regression of soft regulation
on risk preference, ignoring the mediator horizontal implicit
trust, was significant [b = −7.25, t(195) = −2.67, p < 0.01].
Step 2 showed that the regression of soft regulation on the
mediator (horizontal implicit trust) was not significant [b = 0.23,
t(196) = 1.21, p = 0.228]. Step 3 of the mediation process
showed that the regression of horizontal implicit trust (mediator)
on risk preference was significant [b = −2.70, t(195) = −2.72,
p < 0.01]. Step 4 of the analyses revealed that controlling for
the mediator, soft regulation was a significant predictor of risk
preference [b = −7.89, t(196) = −2.87, p < 0.01]. Based on
the insignificant effect of soft regulation on the mediator, we
conclude that horizontal implicit trust does not mediate the
relationship between soft regulation and risk preference, because
there is no connection.
In the case of vertical implicit trust (H3), we found a partial
mediation. Thereby, the direct effect of soft regulation on risk
preference was significant [b = −6.20, t(195) = −2.29, p < 0.05],
as well as the paths of soft regulation on the mediator and the
mediator on risk preference, respectively [b = 0.44, t(196) = 2.42,
p < 0.05; b = −3.81, t(195) = −3.67, p < 0.001]. Also, the total
effect was significant [b =−7.89, t(196) =−2.87, p < 0.01].
When testing if horizontal reason-based trust mediates the
relationship between soft regulation and risk preference (H4),
we found an insignificant effect when ignoring the mediator
[b = −4.49, t(195) = −1.78, p = 0.077]. The regression of soft
regulation on the mediator (horizontal reason-based trust) was
significant [b = 0.50, t(196) = 2.81, p < 0.01]. Also, the regression
of horizontal reason-based trust (mediator) on risk preference
was significant [b = −6.85, t(195) = −6.83, p < 0.001], as was
the total effect [b =−7.89, t(196) =−2.87, p < 0.01].
Finally, we tested for vertical reason-based trust mediating
the relationship between soft regulation and risk preference (H5)
and found no significant direct effect between the two, when
ignoring the mediator [b = −2.05, t(195) = −2.55, p = 0.422].
Again, the regression of soft regulation on the mediator (vertical
reason-based trust) [b = 0.77, t(196) = 4.51, p < 0.001] and
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the regression of the mediator on risk preference [b = −7.52,
t(195) = −7.46, p < 0.001] was significant. Therefore, based
on this results and the significant total effect [b = −7.89,
t(196) = −2.87, p < 0.05], we conclude that the relationship
between soft regulation and risk preference is fully mediated by
vertical reason-based trust.
When looking at means on the MPL of both conditions, we
found that participants in the condition of high soft regulation
(SR+) prefer the uncertain risk of joining the car-sharing
community at a lower probability of a breakdown of the used
car than participants confronted with low soft regulation (SR−)
(MSR+ = 46.55, SDSR+ = 20.20; MSR− = 54.43, SDSR− = 17.87).
Discussion
The second study allowed us to measure the proposed mediating
influence of two kinds of regulation (soft and harsh regulations)
and two kinds of trust (implicit and reason-based trust) on
two different levels (vertical and horizontal trust). We tested
the influence of soft regulation mediated by horizontal implicit
trust, vertical implicit trust, horizontal reason-based trust, and
vertical reason-based trust on the willingness to either take the
uncertain risk of participating in a sharing community or buy
a used car with a known risk of a breakdown (H2–H5). The
results reveal that horizontal and vertical reason-based trust
fully mediate the relationship between soft regulation and risk
preference (H4 and H5). This means that the implementation of
soft regulation mechanisms in a community leads to an increased
trust in both the whole community (vertical) and its single
members (horizontal), based on reasons like sharing the same
values and goals. Furthermore, this increased reason-based trust
leads to a higher willingness to take the risk of participating in
the car-sharing community. In addition, vertical implicit trust
has a partially mediating role (H3). So blindly trusting the whole
community (vertical) partially accounts for the relationship
between soft regulation mechanisms in the community and
participants’ risk preference. However, blindly trusting (implicit
trust) the other community members (horizontal) does not
mediate this relationship; therefore, H2 could not be confirmed.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Based on two studies, the current research shed light on the
effect of regulation on risk preference and the mediating role
of trust. Our results of study 1 show that regulation leads to a
change of risk preference. As a result, the combination of high soft
regulation and low harsh regulation, in particular, implemented
in a sharing community increases people’s preference to take the
uncertain risk of participating in such a community instead of
taking the risk of purchasing a used car. This result confirmed
Hypothesis 1. With the results of study 2, we were able to
show that especially reason-based trust plays a significant role
as a mediator in the relationship between soft regulation and
risk preference. High soft regulation increases people’s reason-
based trust in a sharing community, which leads people to a
higher willingness to take the risk of participating in a sharing
community (H4 and H5). This effect was not completely true
for implicit trust. While horizontal implicit trust does not have a
mediating role, vertical implicit trust allowed us to only partially
explain the relationship (H2 and H3).
Recent studies showed that regulation and trust are
significantly correlated (Hofmann et al., 2017a). However,
so far, the direction of the relationship was unclear. The current
paper is the first in the sharing economy to test the mediating
influence of trust on the relationship between regulation and
risk preference by using a controlled variation of soft and harsh
regulations in experimental conditions and asking for different
kinds of trust afterward. In consideration of our results, we
feel confident to argue not only that the concepts of regulation
and trust correlate with each other but also that the presence
of certain regulations leads to an increase or decrease in trust.
Our results indicate that the presence of soft regulation leads to
increased levels of reason-based trust (horizontal and vertical)
and increases implicit trust on a vertical level. Our results show
that varying information about used regulation in a sharing
community is able not only to influence people’s levels of trust
but moreover to affect their perception of risk and then, again,
their risk-taking behavior.
Limitations and Future Directions
Despite the new insights of the current research, it also comprises
some limitations.
First, besides regulation and trust, we did not include other
factors which could influence people’s preference to take an
uncertain risk in our analysis as control variables, especially
the influence of individual factors, for example, gender, age,
experience, and opinions on sharing economy offers as well
as personality traits, like extraversion and openness, which are
known influences on risk-taking behavior (e.g., Byrnes et al.,
1999; Nicholson et al., 2005; Steinberg et al., 2008). Also,
cultural differences in shared beliefs and values have been subject
of research for decades and have been shown to influence
people’s worldview and behavior. This is also true for people’s
perception of risk and risk-taking behavior (e.g., Dake, 1991). We
therefore assume that participants’ risk preference in a situation
of decision similar to our studies’ scenario could vary depending
on their cultural backgrounds. Considering our sample of mainly
Austrian students, the generalizability of our results may be
limited and should therefore only be transferred to other cultural
settings with caution. Given the fact that sharing economy offers
are available worldwide, we strongly encourage future research
to deal with the relationship between regulation, trust, and risk
preference in the sharing economy in different cultural settings.
Second, the convenient samples of both studies consisted
mostly of students. Some authors argue that students behave
differently than the general population, for example, in their
behavior as consumers (Jones and Sonner, 2001). However, most
consumers of offers and services in the sharing economy are
between the ages of 18 and 29 and show a high educational
level (PwC, 2015). The same is true for the participants in
our samples and can therefore be presumed as a valid sample
for studying the behavior of consumers of car-sharing offers.
Considering the aging of most western populations, an increase
of older consumers of car-sharing offers can be expected in the
next years (Hartl et al., 2020). Therefore, future research may
investigate the relationship between regulation, trust, and risk
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preference in the context of the sharing economy by employing
a more diverse sample.
Third, the chosen experimental design has some limitations.
Specifically, the experimental designs in the laboratory (study
1) and in an online setting (study 2), both using an artificial
scenario, come with a limited ecological validity. Therefore, the
generalizability of the results to a real-life scenario needs to be
proven in further studies. Moreover, in both studies, the amount
of regulation in the car sharing community was manipulated,
while horizontal and vertical implicit trust and reason-based
trust were assessed with a self-reporting scale after participants
decided between the used car and the community car. On the
one hand, this approach allowed testing the direct effect of
regulation on risk preference. On the other hand, with this
sequence of the experimental procedure, trust was only assessed
after participants’ risk preference but was analyzed as a mediator
of the relationship between regulation and risk preference. Future
research on this topic should consider not only to manipulate
harsh and soft regulation but also to manipulate the two kinds
of trust (implicit and reason-based trust) on two different levels
(vertical and horizontal trust).
Furthermore, our results show different effects of horizontal
and vertical implicit trust. While horizontal implicit trust does
not mediate the relationship between soft regulation and risk
preference, vertical implicit trust partially does. As mentioned
above, in communities, horizontal trust and vertical trust are
special compared to other business models in which the trust
in an authority (vertical) can be clearly distinguished from trust
in other consumers (horizontal). However, there is a difference
between trust in the whole community (vertical) and trust in
other community members (horizontal), which can also be
found in our results regarding implicit trust. It seems that high
levels of soft regulation rather lead to implicit trust in other
community members instead of trust in the whole community.
We advise future research to consider looking into the effect
of soft regulation on implicit trust in more detail as well as
into the mediation of vertical and horizontal implicit trust on
the relationship between soft regulation and risk preference as
it is not clear why vertical implicit trust partially mediates the
relationship, while horizontal trust does not at all.
Conclusion and Implications
Our results suggest that soft regulation is one of the external
factors which are considered in the cognitive processes when
forming reason-based trust and can therefore be used as a trust-
building measure and encourage people to participate in the
community. Soft regulation reduces the level of perceived risk
and direct people’s risk preference toward taking the risk of
joining a sharing community instead of choosing alternative
service and good providers. Therefore, we advise the members
and initiators of sharing communities, like car sharing, book
sharing, and food sharing communities and community gardens,
who want to attract new members in the community to introduce
and visibly use soft regulation and thereby foster trust among
current members and potential new ones. Although sharing
communities imply personal contact between members more
often than other models in the sharing economy, like P2P sharing,
the communication between members and the representation
of a community to potential members are often handled online
via a website. As such, the website of the community becomes
relevant even before people decide to participate in transactions.
Thereby, in order to reduce the level of perceived risk and
enhance consumers’ attraction to a service, different trust-
building measures can be implemented on websites (Bart et al.,
2005). Our results suggest that information about high soft
regulation within a community can be used as a trust-building
measure, which can also be implemented on a website and
therefore made visible to potential new members at an early
stage of their decision to participate. However, the influence of
regulation on trust may be important not only to attract new
members but also to support cooperative behavior of existing
members (Mayer et al., 1995). By trusting the other members
of a community and being confident that others will not exploit
one’s own vulnerability by acting uncooperative, again one can
assume members to be more likely to act cooperative themselves.
Besides visualizing soft regulation in a community on its website
to attract new members, soft regulations, like information about
knowledge and support of other members, can also be inserted
in statutes, membership forms, and usage rules to be visible
for active members and support a trusting and supportive
sharing community.
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